Deductibility of Loan Origination Costs by Rosenthal, Alan B.
Buffalo Law Review 
Volume 43 Number 1 Article 8 
4-1-1995 
Deductibility of Loan Origination Costs 
Alan B. Rosenthal 
University at Buffalo School of Law (Student) 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview 
 Part of the Tax Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Alan B. Rosenthal, Deductibility of Loan Origination Costs, 43 Buff. L. Rev. 263 (1995). 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.law.buffalo.edu/buffalolawreview/vol43/iss1/8 
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ University at 
Buffalo School of Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Buffalo Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital 
Commons @ University at Buffalo School of Law. For more information, please contact lawscholar@buffalo.edu. 
Deductibility of Loan Origination Costs
ALAN B. ROSENTHAL"
INTRODUCTION
As of March 31, 1993, U.S. commercial banks had lent over $1.8
trillion to domestic borrowers.' Prior to making a loan, banks
incur certain expenses connected with the loan, including under-
writing, marketing, and administrative costs. Such expenses are
commonly referred to as loan origination costs. A debate rages over
whether loan origination costs should be deducted as ordinary and
necessary business expenses or capitalized over the life of the loan.
Neither the Internal Revenue Service ("Service") nor any
court has ruled on this issue.2 Although lenders have long deducted
loan origination costs without Service opposition, Service Field
Agents ("Agents") conducting bank audits have recently taken the
position that loan origination costs are not deductible because they
are incurred to purchase a capital asset (a loan) and therefore
should be capitalized and amortized over the life of the outstand-
ing loan.3
The American Banking Association ("ABA"), the national
trade and professional association of U.S. commercial banks,4 op-
poses the Agents' position.5 The ABA argues that the costs of
originating a loan should be deducted, not capitalized, because
they are ordinary and necessary business expenses.6
t J.D. Candidate, May 1995, State University of New York at Buffalo School of Law.
1. Henry Ruempler & Paul V. Salfi, Tax Treatment of Loan Origination Costs and
Fees, 60 TAX NoTEs 1745, 1746 (1993).
2. The Service had promised to issue guidance before the end of 1993. [60 Taxes] Bank-
ing Rep. (BNA) No. 20, at 706 (May 17, 1993). However, none has yet issued. If ever issued,
such guidance is likely to have prospective effect only. Id.
3. The Service's position, as presented herein, is derived primarily from Ruempler &
Salfi, supra note 1, and John J. Andaloro & John W. Alexander, IRS Fails to Consider Loan
Origination Costs in Overall Business Context, 6 J. BANK TAX'N, Winter 1993, at 7.
4. Banks of all types and sizes-money center, regional, and community banks-are
members of the ABA. The assets of ABA member banks represent about ninety percent of
U.S. bank assets. Letter from Henry Ruempler, Director of Tax and Accounting for the
American Banking Association, to Abraham N.M. Shashy, Jr., Chief Counsel of the Internal
Revenue Service (Oct. 2, 1992) (on file with author).
5. I take the ABA's position as articulated in Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1. Ruempler
and Salfi are, respectively, ABA Director of Tax and Accounting, and ABA Financial Ana-
lyst. Id.
6. See id. at 1745-46.
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The controversy over deduction versus capitalization of loan
origination costs has arisen because of the inherent benefit to tax-
payers of deducting, rather than capitalizing, an outlay. By deduc-
tion, the cost incurred offsets current income. Non-deductible out-
lays are capitalized, and then either amortized or depreciated over
the life of the relevant asset, set-off against gain on its eventual
sale or disposition, or, where no specific asset or useful life can be
ascertained, deducted upon dissolution of the enterprise.1 As the
Supreme Court has declared, the purpose of capitalization is "to
prevent a taxpayer from utilizing currently a deduction properly
attributable, through amortization, to later tax years when the cap-
ital asset becomes income producing."8 Therefore, the capitaliza-
tion requirement, coupled with amortization, functions to "avoid
distortion of income."9 If banks are allowed to offset business out-
lays against income sooner or later, why the controversy? Because
current deduction of loan origination costs is much more valuable
to a taxpayer bank (and thus equally costly to the U.S. Govern-
ment) than capitalization and amortization of such costs over the
loan's life.10
This Comment examines the debate over the tax treatment of
loan origination costs. Part I presents a brief overview and descrip-
tion of the banking process and the nature of loan origination
costs, including a listing of the many types of costs that are in-
curred by a bank prior to making a loan.
Part II analyzes the relevant sections of the Internal Revenue
Code ("Code") upon which the Agents and the ABA base their ar-
guments. The Agents propone applying section 263(a) of the
Code,11 which disallows deduction of capital expenditures. 12 The
ABA argues for the application of Code section 162,13 which allows
deduction of certain trade or business expenses. 14 Part II will also
7. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner, 112 S. Ct. 1039, 1042-43 (1992).
8. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974).
9. John W. Lee, Doping Out The Capitalization Rules After Indopco, 57 TAx NOTES
669, 670 (1992).
10. This theory is based on the time value of money, i.e., a dollar today is more valua-
ble than the promise of a dollar to be received in the future. Simply put, a current deduc-
tion reduces a taxpayer's taxes this year, leaving him more money to invest this year. Being
forced to refrain from offsetting income until the future means higher current taxes to the
taxpayer, thus leaving him unable to invest the money he would have retained if current
deduction had been allowed. See Note, Fairness and Tax Avoidance in the Taxation of
Installment Sales, 100 HARv. L. REv. 403, 403 n.5 (1986).
11. Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1746.
12. I.R.C. § 263(a) (1988).
13. Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1746.
14. I.R.C. § 162 (1988) (allowing a deduction for all of the ordinary and necessary ex-
penses incurred during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business).
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examine the regulations promulgated under the Code by the Secre-
tary of the Treasury Department.
15
Part III compares and contrasts the arguments for and against
deducting loan origination costs. The authorities the Agents and
the banks rely on include the United States Supreme Court deci-
sions in INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner,6 Commissioner v. Lin-
coln Savings & Loan Association,17 and Commissioner v. Idaho
Power Co.;"8 a 10th Circuit Court of Appeals decision in Colorado
Springs National Bank v. United States;9 Code sections 263A20
and 195;21 Revenue Ruling 92-80;22 and the accounting standards
set out in the Statement of the Financial Accounting Standards
No. 91.23
Finally, this Comment concludes with a discussion of what tax
consequences a bank can reasonably anticipate based on recent
Service actions and the trend in the law.24
I. BANKING AND LOAN ORIGINATION COSTS
One of a bank's major objectives is to lend money at an inter-
est rate spread that covers the costs of intermediation and earns a
return for the bank's shareholders.25 Lending is viewed as one of a
bank's major roles. Federal and state bank regulators and bank
analysts measure bank performance and condition largely by ana-
lyzing loan portfolios, 26 and the Internal Revenue Code's definition
of a bank includes "making loans" among three functions compris-
ing a substantial part of a bank's business.
The loan origination process is essentially the same for all con-
sumer, real estate, and commercial loans. Banks incur expenses
15. The Code grants authority to the Treasury Secretary to "prescribe all needful rules
and regulations for the enforcement of [the Code]." I.R.C. § 7805(a) (1988).
16. 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992); see infra part III.A.
17. 403 U.S. 345 (1971); see infra part III.B.
18. 418 U.S. 1 (1974); see infra part III.C.
19. 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974); see infra part III.D.
20. I.R.C. § 263A (1988) (requiring direct costs and proportionate share of indirect
costs of property to be capitalized); see infra part III.E.
21. I.R.C. § 195 (1988) (stating that no deduction is allowed for a start-up expendi-
ture); see infra part IH.F.
22. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 465; see infra part III.G.
23. ACCOUNTING FOR NONREFUNDABLE FEES AND COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH ORIGINATING OR
ACQUIRING LOANS AND INITIAL DIRECT COSTS OF LEASES, Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 91 (Fin. Accounting Standards Bd. 1986) [hereinafter SFAS 91]; see infra
part HI.H.
24. See infra part IV.
25. Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1746.
26. Id.
27. I.R.C. § 581 (1988).
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which are incorporated into loan pricing strategies and customer
profitability analyses." Loan origination expenses are common to
all banks, and normally recur during the life of a loan.2 9 Further-
more, the particular expenses incurred are specific to each and
every loan recipient. The loan origination process can be divided
into six stages:
1. Proposal: Outlining potential terms for a borrower, includ-
ing the costs of structuring a loan, and then making a tentative
agreement with the borrower;
2. Underwriting: Evaluating the credit worthiness of the bor-
rower by completing a credit analysis and a collateral appraisal, as
well as by determining the borrower's strength based on her cash
flow and financial condition;
3. Approval: Granting the bdnk's commitment to make a loan
after evaluating whether the loan request meets the profitability
requirements of the bank and based on the information about the
borrower gathered during the underwriting stage;
4. Settlement: Agreement between the lender and the bor-
rower after negotiating the detailed terms, the approved conditions
of the loan, and the documentation of the transaction;
5. Funding: Disbursing the loan proceeds in accordance with
the loan documentation;
6. Post-funding: Although this stage marks the end of the loan
origination process, additional marketing, underwriting, appraisal,
legal, and administrative expenses will be incurred throughout the
life of the loan to secure the continuity of both the loan's value
and the relationship with the borrower."0
The six stages in the loan origination process summarize how a
bank incurs loan origination costs. The rest of this comment ex-
plores how these costs should be treated under the tax code.
II. INTERNAL REVENUE CODE
The question of what is the proper tax treatment of loan origi-
nation costs, deduction or capitalization, arises under Code section
161. Section 161 is entitled "Allowance of Deductions" and pro-
vides that "[iun computing taxable income . ..there shall be al-
lowed as deductions the items specified in this part [including sec-
tion 162(a)], subject to the exceptions provided in part IX (sec. 261
and following [including section 263] relating to items not deducti-
28. Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1750.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1750-52.
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ble)."3' Thus, section 161 requires a determination whether loan
origination costs should be subject to section 162(a), allowing the
deduction of ordinary and necessary trade or business expenses, or
section 263(a), disallowing deduction of capital expenditures.
3 2
The two Code sections at issue, sections 162 and 263(a), pro-
vide taxpayers with two methods to offset expenses against income.
Which method applies depends on what, why, and how the ex-
penses were initially incurred. Section 162(a) provides that
"[t]here shall be allowed as a deduction all the ordinary and neces-
sary expenses paid or incurred during the taxable year in carrying
on any trade or business."3 3 Section 263 provides that "no deduc-
tion shall be allowed for any amount paid out for new buildings or
for permanent improvements or betterments made to increase the
value of any property or estate," commonly termed capital expend-
itures.3 4 These two sections thus comprise the framework for deter-
mining whether or not expenses are deductible.
Thus, by enacting these two sections, Congress (1) allowed the
deduction from the current year's income of all ordinary and nec-
essary business expenditures, and (2) required capital expenditures
to be capitalized and properly matched against the income they
generate through amortization or depreciation over the capital as-
set's estimated useful life. 5 However, Congress' wording fails to
31. I.R.C. § 161 (1988).
32. Id. §§ 162(a), 263(a).
33. Id. § 162(a). The Supreme Court has explained and defined the meaning of these
words. See infra part IH.B.
34. I.R.C. § 263(a)(1) (1988). Section 263 contains several specific exceptions to the
general rule. However, these exceptions do not apply to loan origination costs. These excep-
tions include:
(A) expenditures for the development of mines or deposits deductible under sec-
tion 616,
(B) research and experimental expenditures deductible under section 174,
(C) soil and water conservation expenditures deductible under section 175,
(D) expenditures by farmers for fertilizer, etc. deductible under section 180,
(E) expenditures for removal of architectural and transportation barriers to the
handicapped and elderly which the taxpayer elects to deduct under section 190,
(F) expenditures for tertiary injectants with respect to which a deduction is al-
lowed under section 193; or
(G) expenditures for which a deduction is allowed under section 179.
Id. § 263(a)(1)(A)-(G).
35. Bryan Mattingly, INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner: Will the IRS Use a Nebulous
Supreme Court Decision to Capitalize on Unsuspecting Taxpayers?, 81 Ky. L.J. 801, 806
(1992); see Thomas F. Quinn, Takeover Expenses Incurred by the Acquired Corpora-
tion-Not Just An Ordinary Deduction: National Starch & Chemical Corp. v: Commis-
sioner, 10 J. L. & CoM. 167, 169 (1990). The difference between amortization and deprecia-
tion has been described as follows:
Amortization describes loss in value due to the passage of time. Depreciation
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clearly demarcate between deductible and nondeductible outlays.
The Treasury Regulations provide some further guidance. Regula-
tion § 1.263(a)-2(a) provides an example of a capital expenditure:
"The cost of acquisition, construction, or erection of buildings, ma-
chinery and equipment, furniture and fixtures, and similar prop-
erty having a useful life substantially beyond the taxable year." 36
It has generally been held that section 263(a) applies to an expen-
dittire if it creates or enhances or is part of the cost of an asset
that has a.useful life greater than one year and thus prevents the
application of section 162 to such an expenditure.3 7 Regulation
§ 1.461-1(a)(2) provides some further elucidation: "If an expendi-
ture results in the creation of an asset having a useful life which
extends substantially beyond the close of the taxable year, such an
expenditure may not be deductible, or may be deductible only in
part, for the taxable year in which made.
'38
The courts and the Internal Revenue Service have further
elaborated upon the determination whether an expense should be
deducted or capitalized.
III. INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE FIELD AGENTS v. AMERICAN
BANKING ASSOCIATION
A. INDOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner
The leading and most recent case cited by the IRS Agents in
support of their position to capitalize loan origination costs is IN-
DOPCO, Inc. v. Commissioner.9 In INDOPCO, a unanimous Su-
preme Court restated the "'familiar rule' that 'an income tax de-
duction is a matter of legislative grace and that the burden of
refers to the gradual reduction in value of property because of physical deteriora-
tion through use. A taxpayer generally amortizes intangible assets and depreciates
tangible assets. For example, the taxpayer amortizes the cost of prepaid expense
payments, such as advance rental payments, over the useful life of the payments.
In the case of tangible assets the taxpayer depreciates the cost over the useful life
of the asset.
Id. at 169 n.14 (citations omitted).
36. Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-2(a) (as amended in 1987).
37. See Central Tex. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. United States, 731 F.2d 1181 (5th Cir. 1984);
Darlington-Hartsville Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. United States, 393 F.2d 494 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 962 (1968); Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th
Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68, original holding on this issue reaff'd, 354 F.2d
410 (4th Cir. 1965); Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1985);
Florida Publishing Co. v. Commissioner, 64 T.C. 269 (1975), aff'd by unpublished opinion,
552 F.2d 367 (5th Cir. 1977).
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.461-1(a)(2) (as amended in 1992).
39. 112 S. Ct. 1039 (1992). See Andaloro & Alexander, supra note 3, at 8; Ruempler &
Salfi, supra note 1, at 1746.
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clearly showing the right to the claimed deduction is on the tax-
payer.' ",40 Additionally, the Court observed that the language of
Code sections 162 and 263 support the notion that deductions are
exceptions to the norm of capitalization.4 ' Under INDOPCO,
therefore, the burden of proving that loan origination costs are de-
ductible falls squarely on the shoulders of the lender.
INDOPCO did not involve loan origination costs, but, instead,
professional expenses incurred by a target corporation in a friendly
takeover.42 Discussing sections 162(a) and 263 of the Code, the
Court pronounced, based on previous Supreme Court decisions,
that one section must be construed in light of the other.43 As origi-
nally stated in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings,
[d]eductions are specifically enumerated [in the Code] and thus are subject
to disallowance in favor of capitalization. See §§ 161 and 261. Nondeduct-
ible capital expenditures, by contrast, are not exhaustively enumerated in
the Code; rather than providing a "complete list of nondeductible expendi-
tures," Lincoln Savings, § 263 serves as a general means of distinguishing
capital expenditures from current expenses.4
Thus, the Court held that, in enacting these sections, Congress
specified the exclusive list of deductible expenses. Based on this
reasoning, loan origination costs are not deductible because the
Code does not so specify.
The INDOPCO Court employed a "useful life of the expense"
analysis to determine whether the expenses should be deducted or
capitalized: "Although the mere presence of an incidental future
benefit-some future benefit-may not warrant capitalization, a
taxpayer's realization of benefits beyond the year in which the ex-
penditure is incurred is undeniably important in determining
whether the appropriate tax treatment is immediate deduction or
capitalization. '45 This test relates to Congress' purpose to match
expenses with the revenues of the taxable period to which they are
40. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1043 (quoting Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner,
319 U.S. 590, 593 (1943)). See also Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488, 493 (1940); New Colo-
nial Ice Co. v. Helvering, 292 U.S. 435, 440 (1934).
41. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1042-43.
42. Id. at 1041. INDOPCO involved a friendly acquisition that changed a publicly held,
freestanding corporation into a wholly owned subsidiary. Id. The professional expenses con-
sisted of investment bank underwriting, accounting, printing, proxy solicitation, and legal
fees associated with a takeover. Id. at 1042.
43. Id. at 1043 & n.5 (listing cases).
44. Id. at 1043 (citation omitted) (quoting Commissioner v. Lincoln Sav. & Loan Ass'n,
403 U.S. 345, 358 (1971)).
45. Id. at 1044-45. See also United States v. Mississippi Chem. Corp., 405 U.S. 298, 310




properly attributable, thereby resulting in a more accurate calcula-
tion of net income for tax purposes.4" Furthermore, the INDOPCO
Court stated that "the text of the Code's capitalization provision,
§ 263(a)(1), which refers to 'permanent improvements or better-
ments,' itself envisions an inquiry into the duration and extent of
the benefits realized by the taxpayer.
'47
The INDOPCO Court concluded that the transaction pro-
duced significant benefits to the taxpayer which extended beyond
the tax year in question. Because the acquiring corporation
benefitted from the availability of the target's enormous resources
over many years, the Court held that the expenses should be capi-
talized rather than deducted in the current taxable year. 8
The benefit of having a loan outstanding for a term of more
than one year is an important goal of the banking industry. The
Agents might be expected to argue that this fact should be ac-
corded great weight for purposes of determining the "useful life" of
the asset created or enhanced by loan origination costs. Accord-
ingly, the costs incurred to make loans would be amortized over
the time period during which the banks benefit from them, i.e.,
over the term of the loan. Thus, based on the reasoning of the Su-
preme Court in INDOPCO, the Agents could argue that the costs
incurred to eventually receive the loan's benefits should be capital-
ized because such benefits extend well past the current deducting
year.
The ABA contends that the Supreme Court's decision in IN-
DOPCO is not an authority for the capitalization of loan origina-
tion costs.49 Instead, they argue that the Agents mistakenly at-
tempt to apply the dicta from this decision. 50 The main thrust of
the ABA's argument is that the case of loan origination costs and
INDOPCO are factually distinguishable. 1 The banks further claim
that the loan origination process is an ordinary and necessary un-
dertaking which does not result in the same type of long-term ben-
efit that resulted from the corporate restructuring in INDOPCO.
52
Thus, a one-time expenditure in connection with a corporate take-
over is very different from the loan origination expenses that con-
46. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co., 418 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); Ellis Banking
Corp. v. Commissioner, 688 F.2d 1376, 1379 (11th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1207
(1983).
47. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1045.
48. Id. at 1045-46.






tinually recur in the banking business.5 3
The ABA argues that the Court's INDOPCO ruling was based
upon a long-recognized practice of capitalizing an expenditure in-
curred in connection with a change in corporate structure, and
thus did not signify a new general rule of law for determining
whether an expenditure must be capitalized.5 4 Although the opin-
ion stated that the Code itself, under section 263(a)(1), "envisions
an inquiry into the duration and extent of the benefits realized by
the taxpayer, '55 and that "some future aspect" is undeniably im-
portant, the Court added that such future aspect "is not necessa-
rily controlling. '5 6 This, the banks could argue, limited the Court's
holding, and so the ruling did not decide that every expense de-
voted to income production or any other need of an ongoing busi-
ness must be capitalized. 57 Thus, it would be expected that the
ABA would propone that INDOPCO did not change the law to re-
quire capitalization of loan origination costs. Instead, INDOPCO
furthered the long-standing, narrow rule that capitalization is re-
quired only if the expense was incurred in connection with a corpo-
rate restructuring.
The argument that INDOPCO should be limited to its facts
appears unwarranted. Based on its holding in Lincoln Savings, the
INDOPCO Court articulated a general analysis of the Code's re-
quirements as to deduction versus capitalization, i.e., as to sections
162 and 263(a). None of these authorities solely revolve around
corporate restructurings. On the contrary, much of the INDOPCO
Court's discussion was of a general nature, thus implying its appli-
cability beyond the corporate restructure context.
B. Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings & Loan Association
The test to determine whether an expense is currently deduct-
ible was originally articulated in Commissioner v. Lincoln Savings
& Loan Association.5 8 There the Court decided that an expense is
not ordinary if it is made in an attempt to create a "separate and
distinct asset. '5 9 The Agents rely on this decision, arguing that
53. Id. at 1747.
54. Id. at 1746.
55. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1045.
56. Id. at 1044-45.
57. The Court in INDOPCO cited General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d
712, 715 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964), for the proposition that an expense
incurred to change the corporate structure for the future is not a deductible ordinary and
necessary business expense.
58. 403 U.S. 345 (1971).
59. Id. at 354'
1995]
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW [Vol. 43
each loan is a separate and distinct asset, and, therefore, the costs
incurred to create each loan are part and parcel of the loan and
must be capitalized.60
Lincoln Savings determined whether a savings and loan insti-
tution, under the National Housing Act,61 could deduct, pursuant
to Code section 162(a), an additional insurance premium.6 2 Relying
on precedent, the Court articulated the following test: "To qualify
as an allowable deduction under Section 162(a) ... an item must
(1) be 'paid or incurred during the taxable year,' (2) be for 'carry-
ing on any trade or business,' (3) be an 'expense,' (4) be a 'neces-
sary' expense, and (5) be an 'ordinary' expense."6 3
The Court in Lincoln Savings was only concerned with one of
the test's five requirements. The Court was satisfied that the first
four requirements had been met because the premium was defi-
nitely a necessary expense that was incurred in the taxable year in
carrying on a trade or business.6' Therefore, all that remained to
be decided was whether the expense was ordinary. The majority
decided that the expense was not ordinary because it was a
payment that serve[d] to create or enhance . . . what [was] essentially a
separate and distinct additional asset and that, as an inevitable conse-
60. See Andalora & Alexander, supra note 3, at 8; Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at
1745. Although the Court in INDOPCO modified the separate and distinct asset test, the
Lincoln Savings analysis is still useful for determining whether an expense falls under sec-
tion 162(a).
61. National Housing Act § 404(d), as amended, 75 Stat. 482, 483-84 (1961) (repealed
1989).
62. Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 345. Section 404(d) provided as follows:
Each insured institution ... shall annually pay to the Corporation, at such
time and in such manner as the Corporation shall by regulations or otherwise pre-
scribe, an additional premium in the nature of a prepayment with respect to fu-
ture premiums of such institution ... equal to 2 per centum of the net increase in
all accounts of its insured members ... for the purchase of stock of the Federal
Home Loan Bank of which such institution is a member ....
75 Stat. 482, 483-84 (1961) (repealed 1989).
63. Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 352 (quoting I.R.C. § 162(a)). The Lincoln Savings
Court cited Justice Cardozo's opinion in Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111 (1933), to empha-
size the difference between "ordinary" and "necessary" and the requirement that both must
be satisfied to allow a deduction under Section 162(a). Id. at 115. The Lincoln Savings
Court further cited two other Supreme Court opinions to expand upon Justice Cardozo's
explanation. Justice Douglas in Deputy v. Du Pont, 308 U.S. 488 (1940), explained that "the
term [ordinary] ordinarily has the connotation of normal, usual, or customary." Id. at 495-
96. And Justice Stewart, in Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687 (1966), stated that "[tihe
principal function of the term 'ordinary' in § 162(a) is to clarify the distinction, often diffi-
cult, between those expenses that are currently deductible and those that are in the nature
of capital expenditures, which, if deductible at all, must be amortized over the useful life of
the asset." Id. at 689-90.
64. Lincoln Savings, 403 U.S. at 354.
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quence, the payment [was] capital in nature and not an expense, let alone
an ordinary expense, deductible under § 162(a) in the absence of other fac-
tors not established here.65
The Agents might conclude that loan origination costs can be
viewed as creating a separate and distinct asset. They would prob-
ably argue that, although four of the five requirements of the Lin-
coln Savings test are met, the ordinary expense branch is not satis-
fied under Lincoln Savings; therefore, no deduction may be
allowed. They could further argue that the lack of explicit mention
of loan origination costs or additional premium costs in section
263(a)'s list of nondeductible capital expenditures is unimportant
because it is clear from the very language of sections 162 and
263(a) that the two sections together were not intended to provide
all-inclusive listings. 6
C. Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.
The Agents also base their argument to capitalize loan origina-
tion costs on Commissioner v. Idaho Power Co.6 7 In Idaho Power,
the Court reasoned that if an asset is consumed over a period
longer than one year, it is a capital asset and, correspondingly, over
that period, its theoretical value and utility become reduced. 8 The
Idaho Power Court explained the difference between an asset that
would be "used up" in the present year and one which would have
a significant life beyond the year in question:
When the asset is used to further the taxpayer's day-to-day business opera-
tions, the periods of benefit usually correlate with the production of income.
* * .It is clear, however, that different principles are implicated when the
consumption of the asset takes place in the construction of other assets
that, in the future, will produce income themselves .... [T]he cost, al-
though certainly presently incurred, is related to the future and is appropri-
ately allocated as part of the cost of acquiring an income-producing capital
asset.6 9
The Court endeavored to treat an expense in "a manner that com-
65. Id.
66. Iowa S. Utils. Co. v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d 382, 385 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 379
U.S. 946 (1964); General Bancshares Corp. v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 712, 716 (8th Cir.),
cert. denied, 379 U.S. 832 (1964); see United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 397 U.S. 580
(1970); Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572 (1970); Helvering v. Winmill, 305 U.S. 79
(1938).
67. 418 U.S. 1 (1974). See Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1746.
68. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 10.
69. Id. at 11.
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ports with accounting and taxation realities. 7 0 The Court noted
that "accepted accounting practice and established tax principles
require the capitalization of the cost of acquiring a capital asset.
'71
Additionally, the Court observed that "[i]t has long been recog-
nized, as a general matter, that costs incurred in the acquisition
. . . of a capital asset are to be treated as capital expenditures.
1 72
Although the Court appeared to have decided that the costs of
creating a capital asset are to be capitalized, it went on to discuss
section 263's purpose "to reflect the basic principle that a capital
expenditure may not be deducted from current income. '7 3 Thus,
the Idaho Power Court's reasoning is based on the principle that
capitalization "serves to prevent a taxpayer from utilizing cur-
rently a deduction properly attributable, through amortization, to
later tax years when the capital asset becomes income
producing. ' '174
The Agents might be expected to argue that the costs incurred
by a bank to make a loan are analogous to the costs incurred in
Idaho Power. Clearly, they both involve expenses that create an
asset which will be in existence beyond the current taxable year.
The Court stated that the time frame for taxing the costs should
relate to when the benefits will be received. Therefore, the loan
origination costs, under a highly plausible Agents' theory, should
be capitalized over the life of the asset they are creating, i.e., until
the entire loan is repaid.
The Idaho Power Court did not seem to rely on the separate
and distinct asset test of Lincoln Savings. Instead, it attacked the
issue from the standpoint of whether the asset could be used up in
the single year in which the expenses were incurred to create it.
The Court wanted to avoid allowing a deduction for a cost that will
provide a future benefit.
Both sides admit that normally a loan has a life beyond the
current taxable year. Therefore, even if it were conceded that the
Lincoln Savings "separate and distinct asset" test does not apply
to loan origination costs, under Idaho Power, they must be capital-
ized because they are incurred to create loans from which benefit is
70. In Idaho Power, the respondent, a public utility, had claimed a depreciation deduc-
tion on its federal income tax return for all of its transportation equipment, including that
equipment which was used to construct capital facilities having a useful life greater than one
year. However, on its books, the taxpayer, as required by the regulatory agencies, had
charged these expenses to capital assets that were used in construction. Id. at 5.
71. Id. at 12; see infra part IILH.
72. Idaho Power, 418 U.S. at 12 (quoting Woodward v. Commissioner, 397 U.S. 572, 575
(1970)).
73. Id. at 16.
74. Id.
[Vol. 43
1995] LOAN ORIGINATION COSTS
derived beyond the taxable year. 5
D. Colorado Springs National Bank v. United States
The ABA attempts to rebut the argument made by the Agents
for capitalization based on Colorado Springs Natio nal Bank v.
United States.6 In Colorado Springs, the Tenth Circuit disagreed
with the Government's contention that a bank's new credit card
system was a "separate and distinct asset" requiring capitalization.
The court held for the taxpayer bank that it could deduct all of
the computer, advertising, clerical, education, and start-up costs
associated with setting up a credit card system. 7 Based on the rea-
soning in Colorado Springs, the banks argue that a loan is not a
separate and distinct asset, either.
78
The Colorado Springs court found that "[t]he credit card sys-
tem enable[d] a bank to carry on an old business in a new way, '7 9
and a new method of conducting old business is definitely distin-
guishable from a new business.80 The court concluded that an ex-
tension of credit which required both a risk evaluation and a credit
investigation were new methods of conducting an old business.8 1
What the taxpayer had done was determine the risk involved in
75. The Service continued the Idaho Power Court's line of reasoning in Tech. Adv.
Mem. 90-24-003 (March 2, 1990). The specific issue in TAM 90-24-003 was whether a sav-
ings bank should be allowed to deduct, under Code § 162, amounts paid to establish a home
equity line of credit (HELOC). The Service concluded that because HELOC loans have a
useful life that extends beyond the current taxable year, the costs incurred to create or
acquire them must be capitalized pursuant to § 263(a) of the Code. Therefore, the Service
would argue, in respect of loan origination costs, the burden is on the lending institutions to
prove that the useful life of their loan is less than one year in order to be able to deduct
these expenses.
In rebuttal, the ABA could argue that caselaw presents no such bright line test to deter-
mine deductibility. See James D. Goeller, Will Accounting Rules Bar Deductibility of Loan
Origination Costs?, 6 J. BANK TAX'N 8 (1993).
One commentator has stated that this TAM, in essence, suggests that the "IRS is at-
tempting to lay the groundwork to support [the capitalization of] all loan origination or
acquisition costs." W. Michael Bryant, Costs Incurred to Create or Acquire Loans Must be
Capitalized, TAx ADviSER, Feb. 1991, at 96. See also Bonded Mortgage Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 27 B.T.A. 965, 971 (1933), afl'd in part and rev'd in part, 70 F.2d 341 (4th Cir. 1934).
76. 505 F.2d 1185 (10th Cir. 1974). See Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1748.
77. Colorado Springs, 505 F.2d at 1187. In Colorado Springs, the taxpayer was a full
service, national bank. The bank acquired the right to use the Master Charge credit card
system in late 1968 and thus started the use of Master Charge in the State of Colorado. The
taxpayer deducted its start-up expenses as business expenses. Id.
78. Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1748.
79. Colorado Springs, 505 F.2d at 1190.
80. Id.; see Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), va-
cated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68 (1965).
81. Colorado Springs, 505 F.2d at 1190.
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the issuance of the credit card; and "[s]uch risk determination
[was both] appropriate and useful to development of taxpayer's
banking business." '82 Based upon this reasoning, the court allowed
deduction of the credit card system start-up costs.
The banks may argue that loan origination costs warrant the
same tax treatment as the start-up costs in Colorado Springs, be-
cause they are both incurred to carry on an old business of banking
in a new way. 3 Therefore, the costs incurred to make a loan would
thus be deducted in the same way that the costs to set up a credit
card system were deducted.
Colorado Springs appears to be inapplicable to loan origina-
tion costs because of a fundamental difference between a credit
card system and a loan. A credit card system has no determinable
useful life. Loans, by contrast, have definite useful lives, over
which their origination costs can be amortized.
Colorado Springs is the only case the banks can offer to sup-
port their position. Without more, the banks appear to face a steep
uphill battle. After all, Lincoln Savings, which disallowed the de-
duction of loan insurance premiums, appears just as applicable (or
inapplicable) to loan origination costs as Colorado Springs. In
other words, Colorado Springs, on its own and without further
support, does not appear to constitute precedent for allowing de-
duction of loan origination costs. The Agents, in contrast, do not
base their reliance on a single case. To bolster their analysis, they
cite three Supreme Court decisions: Idaho Power, Lincoln Savings,
and INDOPCO.
E. Section 263A and Notice 88-86
In INDOPCO, the Court read Code section 162 narrowly,
while reading the capitalization section, section 263(a), as the all-
encompassing way to treat expenses that do not fit into the narrow
section 162 mold. 4 Thus, the Court concluded that the debate cen-
ters around two sections, 162 and 263(a). However, the banks have
attempted to bring a third section into the picture.", They have
relied on section 263A to show that loan origination costs do not
have to be capitalized.
Congress enacted the uniform capitalization rules of Code sec-
tion 263A88 to alleviate problems caused by section 263(a). Section
82. Id. at 1191.
83. See Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1748.
84. See supra part Ill.A.
85. Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1747.
86. Section 263A states:
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263A was an attempt to simplify the multiple sets of rules on capi-
talization and to make a "single, comprehensive set of rules ...
[to] govern the capitalization of costs of producing, acquiring and
holding property, including interest expense. '87 Following this en-
actment, many commentators believed that loan origination costs
would be required to be capitalized under this section.8  However,
in Notice 88-86, the IRS stated:
[T]he origination of a loan shall be treated under Section 263A as the pro-
duction of intangible property as opposed to the acquisition of intangible
property for resale. Thus the capitalization rules of Section 263A shall not
apply to such activity, because Section 263A only applies to the production
of tangible personal property. Section 263A, however applies to taxpayers
purchasing pre-existing loans from other parties for resale. Such taxpayers
are treated as acquiring intangible property for resale, and hence, are sub-
ject to the uniform capitalization rules. The provisions of this paragraph
apply only for purposes of Section 263A and no inference relating to the
treatment of such property for other purposes of the Code is intended. 9
The banks would probably rely on this Notice to show that loan
origination costs should not be capitalized under section 263A.
However, the INDOPCO Court, by not even mentioning section
263A, decided by clear implication that 263A is inapplicable to the
question whether an expenditure is deductible or not.
F. Section 195
Section 195 of the Code, which provides for the deductibility
of certain business start-up expenditures, can be cited by both
sides to support their positions on the taxation of loan origination
costs.90 A start-up cost is a cost incurred by a taxpayer subsequent
(a) Nondeductibility of certain direct and indirect costs.-
(1) In general.- In the case of any property to which this section applies...
(A) in the case of property which is inventory in the hands of the taxpayer,
shall be included in inventory costs, and
(B) in the case of any other property, shall be capitalized.
(b) Property to which section applies.- Except as otherwise provided in this sec-
tion, this section shall apply to-
(1) Property produced by taxpayer.- Real or tangible personal property pro-
duced by the taxpayer.
(2) Property acquired for resale. .
I.R.C. § 263A(a)-(b) (1988).
87. STAFF OF THE JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, GENERAL EXPLANATION OF THE TAX
REFORM AcT OF 1986, at 508-09 (1987). See Treas. Reg. § 1.263A-l(a) (1986).
88. Goeller, supra note 75, at 5.
89. I.R.S. Notice 88-86, 1988-2 C.B. 401.
90. I.R.C. § 195 (1988).
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to a decision to open a particular business but prior to its actual
operation."1 The general rule of section 195(a) is that "except as
otherwise provided. . . no deduction shall be allowed for start-up
expenditures." '92 By enacting section 195, Congress permitted tax-
payers to elect to prorate a deduction for allowed start-up expendi-
tures over a period of not less than sixty months.
9 3
Section 195 codified the "pre-opening expense doctrine.
'9 4
The doctrine holds that costs incurred to create a new trade or
business must be capitalized because (1) section 162 does not apply
until the trade or business begins and (2) the costs of starting a
new trade or business are incurred to create an asset with a useful
life extending beyond the current taxable year.
5
The language of section 195 makes it clear that expansion
costs of an existing business are not eligible for amortization: they
must be either deducted under section 162 or capitalized under
section 263. The Agents would be expected to cite INDOPCO for
the proposition that expansion costs in an existing business are not
deductible. Thus, they would argue, INDOPCO and section 195 to-
gether require that an existing business' expansion costs are both
nondeductible (under INDOPCO) and non-amortizable (under sec-
tion 195).16 The Agents, in other words, would argue that loan orig-
ination costs are neither deductible nor amortizable over sixty
months, but rather must be capitalized.
91. Specifically, the Internal Revenue Code defines the term "start-up expenditure" to
mean any amount-
(A) paid or incurred in connection with-
(i) investigating the creation or acquisition of an active trade or business, or
(ii) creating an active trade or business, or
(iii) any activity engaged in for profit and for the production of income before
the day on which the active trade or business begins, in anticipation of such activ-
ity becoming an active trade or business, and
(B) which, if paid or incurred in connection with the operation of an existing ac-
tive trade or business (in the same field as the trade or business referred to in
subparagraph (A)), would be allowable as a deduction for the taxable year in
which paid or incurred.
Id. § 195(c)(1).
92. Id. § 195(a).
93. Section 195(b) states: "Start-up expenditures may, at the election of the taxpayer,
be treated as deferred expenses. Such deferred expenses shall be allowed as a deduction
prorated equally over such period of not less than 60 months as may be selected by the
taxpayer. . . ." Id. § 195(b).
94. George B. Javaras & Todd F. Maynes, Business Expansion and Protection in the
Post-INDOPCO World, 55 TAx NoTEs 971, 974 (1992).
95. Id.; see Richmond Television Corp. v. United States, 345 F.2d 901 (4th Cir.), va-
cated on other grounds, 382 U.S. 68, original holding on this issue reaff'd, 354 F.2d 410 (4th
Cir. 1965).
96. Mattingly, supra note 35, at 820.
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The banks might also cite section 195 to bolster their argu-
ment for deductibility. Congress, they could argue, created section
195 to allow start-up expenditures to be amortized over sixty
months, if such expenditures would have been deductible in an ex-
isting business. If, as the Agents would contend, expansion costs
were not deductible for an existing business, "section 195 would be
useless because no start-up expenditure could satisfy the 'other-
wise deductible as a business expansion expenditure' require-
ment. '' 97 Therefore, the banks would contend, expansion expenses,
of which loan origination costs are a variety, are eligible for
deduction.
This argument assumes that loan origination costs are expan-
sion costs as were the costs of setting-up a credit card system in
Colorado Springs. In the unlikely event that loan origination costs
are deemed start-up expenditures,98 section 195 would require
their amortization over sixty months and thus prevent their cur-
rent deduction. Finally, section 195 may refer to expenses, such as
advertising and other selling expenses, that are specifically recog-
nized exceptions to the capitalization requirement. Thus, it may
well be incorrect to read section 195 to broaden its own applicabil-
ity by transforming otherwise nondeductible expenses into deduct-
ible expenses.
G. Revenue Ruling 92-80
The ABA would be expected to cite Revenue Ruling 92-801 to
demonstrate that loan origination costs should be deductible. The
question there presented to the IRS was whether the Supreme
Court's decision in INDOPCO affected the treatment of advertis-
ing costs. Generally, advertising costs had been deductible. Indeed,
Regulation § 1.162-1(a) provides that "advertising and other sell-
ing expenses" are among the deductible business expenses under
Code section 162.100 The Service ruled that the INDOPCO decision
did not affect the treatment of advertising costs under section
162(a) even though such expenditures provided some future bene-
fit to the business incurring the expense. 10 1
97. Id.; see Do Briarcliff Candy and Code Section 195 Stiff National Starch?, 49 TAX
NoTEs 1223-29 (1990).
98. Cf. Cottage Say. Ass'n v. Commissioner, 499 U.S. 554 (1991) (holding that an en-
tity is materially different if each embodies a legally distinct entitlement). The banks could
argue, albeit tenuously, that each loan can be considered a separate entity because each has
its unique borrower, interest rate, and risk.
99. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
100. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-1(a) (as amended in 1988).
101. Rev. Rul. 92-80, 1992-2 C.B. 57.
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After ruling in Revenue Ruling 92-80 that the costs of adver-
tising are deductible, the Service did not end its discussion. It fur-
ther stated that "[o]nly in the unusual circumstance where adver-
tising is directed towards obtaining future benefits significantly
beyond those traditionally associated with ordinary product adver-
tising or with institutional or goodwill advertising, must the costs
of the advertising be capitalized by the lending institutions."'
10 2 It
appears reasonable to infer from the Service's language here that if
the future benefit is only a secondary or incidental purpose of the
advertising expenditure, a current deduction is allowed. 10 3 The
banks might thus rely on this Ruling to show that loan origination
costs are only an incidental expense in the lending process and, as
such, should be deductible as are advertising costs.
The banks would probably argue that if the Service has al-
lowed the continued deductibility of advertising expenses following
the decision in INDOPCO, then it should also allow the continued
deductibility of loan origination costs. Both are recurring expenses
incurred in a trade or business, and both confer benefits to the
taxpayer beyond the current year.
The Agents could respond that Revenue Ruling 92-80 is com-
pletely in line with INDOPCO because advertising is a specifically
enumerated expense that may be deducted currently under Regu-
lation § 1.162-1(a). Loan origination costs are not; nor are they so
similar in nature to adverstising costs that rules covering advertis-
ing costs should necessarily be applied to also cover loan origina-
tion costs. Furthermore, immediately after upholding the deduct-
ibility of advertising costs after INDOPCO as a specifically allowed
exception to capitalization, the Service handed down Technical
Advisory Memorandum (TAM) 92-40-004.104 The TAM discussed
the tax ramifications of costs incurred to remove asbestos insula-
tion from manufacturing equipment. The Service concluded that
because the taxpayer received long term future benefits that ex-
102. Id.; see, e.g., Cleveland Elec. Illuminating Co. v. United States, 7 Cl. Ct. 220 (1975)
(capitalization of advertising costs incurred to allay public opposition to the granting of a
license to a nuclear power plant).
103. Emerson J. Addison, Jr., INDOPCO I: IRS Rules Advertising Deductible..., 23
TAX ADVISER 801, 802 (1992).
104. Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-40-004 (June 29, 1992). The Service stated that the costs of
replacing asbestos were capital expenditures because the taxpayer received long-term future
benefits that were expected to accrue beyond the year in question. Id.; see Dean A.
Rocheleau,. . . INDOPCO II: IRS Disallows Deductions for Asbestos Removal, 23 TAx AD-
VISER 802, 804 (1992) ("According to Letter Ruling (TAM) 9240004 ... the Service's ration-
ale in deciding when taxpayers are entitled to deduct repairs as current business expenses is




tended beyond the year in question, the costs were required to be
capitalized.
Thus, although the ABA would hope that Revenue Ruling 92-
80 would be extended to allow deduction of loan origination costs
after INDOPCO, Revenue Ruling 92-80 clearly appears only to al-
low the deductibility of a cost Congress has specifically allowed to
be deducted. If no specific allowance for deduction appears in the
Code or Regulations, as was the case with asbestos removal in
TAM 92-40-004, it appears that capitalization is required. Accord-
ingly, the Agents would probably argue that loan origination costs,
as non-excepted expenses, must be capitalized.
H. Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 91
The Agents also rely on the Statement of Financial Account-
ing Standards (SFAS) No. 91.105 This 1986 Statement changed the
generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) for loan origina-
tion expenses. Under SFAS No. 91, banks and other lenders are
required to capitalize and amortize loan origination costs over the
life of the loan.10 6 The expected significance of SFAS No. 91 for
the Agents is that the new accounting requirements mean that
loan origination costs can now quite readily be measured because
they now must be accounted for separately.
107
SFAS No. 91 was enacted because a few financial institutions
were attempting to improve the appearance of their financial state-
ments by booking unusually large loan origination costs in the year
of loan origination, even if the costs clearly were offset by interest
received over the life of the loan.10 8 Thus the banks might conclude
that neither the purpose nor the intent of the statement was to
separately keep track of the costs of origination in order to tax
them differently. Rather, the rule was promulgated to stop the
abuse of receiving a double benefit. Based on the purpose of SFAS
No. 91, the banks can argue that SFAS No. 91 should not operate
to influence the tax consequences of loan origination costs.
105. SFAS 91, supra note 23. See Thomas P. Ochsenschlager, Capitalization of Loan
Origination Costs?, TAx ADVISER, Feb. 1993, at 94.
106. SFAS 91, supra note 23, 5. "Direct loan origination costs ... include only (a)
incremental direct costs of loan origination . . . incurred in transactions with independent
third parties ... and (b) certain costs directly related to specific activities performed by the
lender." Id. 6. The board stated that examples of loan origination costs include: evaluating
the borrower's finances and credit risk, evaluating and recording guarantees, collateral and
other security arrangements, negotiating loan terms, preparing and processing loan docu-
ments and closing the transaction. Id.
107. Goeller, supra note 75, at 3; Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1749.
108. Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1749. See SFAS 91, supra note 23, 1 44.
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The Agents, by using SFAS No. 91 and its deferral of costs,
might have found a basis in accounting for their argument to capi-
talize loan origination costs. When the Accounting Board changes a
method of accounting, the Agents could react by changing their
position for the pragmatic purpose of preventing conflict with the
FASB. Furthermore, that the Accounting Board may not have in-
tended to effect a tax change does not mean that the Agents can-
not use the change as a strong reason to change the taxing of loan
origination costs.'0 9
IV. CONCLUSION
The Internal Revenue Service has recently given some direc-
tion to taxpayers who are unsure whether they should be deduct-
ing or capitalizing the costs incurred to make a loan.110 However,
this announcement does not answer the question whether the loan
origination costs are to be deducted or capitalized. Instead, it stops
lenders from changing their accounting method of capitalizing loan
origination costs until a ruling is given by the Service. Since a tax-
ation guideline on loan origination costs has not yet been issued,
an analysis of the arguments set forth by the Agents and the
American Banking Association is helpful to determine what type of
tax treatment will be given to loan origination costs.
The analysis should surround the case law precedent that
should be cited by each side to the debate. The Agents can point
to INDOPCO, Idaho Power, and Lincoln Savings to show the
trend of the Supreme Court from the early 1970s through 1992.
The leading case for the lending institutions is Colorado Springs, a
109. See Ruempler & Salfi, supra note 1, at 1749.
110. Announcement 93-60, 1993-16 I.R.B. 9 (April 19, 1993). This announcement stated
that:
Lenders that desire to change their method of accounting from a method of de-
ducting loan origination costs when paid to a method of capitalizing loan origina-
tion costs should not request permission to make this change from the National
Office of the Internal Revenue Service at this time. This is a temporary suspension
of the Service's ruling program with respect to this matter, pending the issuance
of a revenue procedure for lenders who wish to change their method of accounting
for loan origination costs.
Id. The announcement further provided that any Form 3115, Application for Change in
Accounting Method, currently on file will be returned to the taxpayer except where the issue
of loan origination costs is currently pending. A taxpayer who is being audited or who gets
audited before an Internal Revenue Service decision is handed down may file a Form 3115
application with the Field Agent during the examination. The announcement concluded by
informing taxpayers that they will not be adversely affected by being forced to file a method
change request with an auditor as compared with other taxpayers. Id.; see also Rulings on




Tenth Circuit decision from the early 1970s.
INDOPCO, the most recent decision handed down by the Su-
preme Court on the issue of deductibility versus capitalization, can
be viewed as clarifying the previous three decisions. Blackmun's
majority opinion indirectly affirmed and expanded the propositions
advanced in Idaho Power and Lincoln Savings, i.e., the useful life
of the asset test, and the separate and distinct asset test, respec-
tively. The INDOPCO Court, in furtherance of Lincoln Savings,
characterized a deduction as a matter of legislative grace, one of a
set of specifically enumerated exceptions to the norm of capitaliza-
tion. Additionally, the Court followed Idaho Power by providing
that one needs to match expenses with revenues and to look at the
extent and duration of the benefits received in determining the
useful life of an expense.
The INDOPCO decision not only allows the application of
Lincoln Savings, it has broadened it to a much more expansive set
of circumstances. In doing so, the Court is effectively limiting the
use of Colorado Springs as future precedent. While reviewing the
separate and distinct asset test of Lincoln Savings, the INDOPCO
Court stated:
It by no means follows ... that only expenditures that create or enhance
separate and distinct assets are to be capitalized under § 263. . .. In short,
Lincoln Savings holds that the creation of a separate and distinct asset well
may be a sufficient but not a necessary condition to classification as a capi-
tal expenditure."'
Therefore, the main argument presented by the ABA under Colo-
rado Springs, i.e., that a loan origination cost is not a separate and
distinct asset and thus must be deducted, appears to have dis-
integrated in light of the clarification of the Lincoln Savings test
in INDOPCO.
The Supreme Court in INDOPCO analyzed the deductibility
of an expense based on sections 162 and 263 of the Code, the sec-
tions that have always been applied in previous decisions. The
ABA might attempt to bring in sections 195 and 263A, but neither
helps clear up the dilemma. Expansion costs of an existing busi-
ness were found not to be deductible in INDOPCO; thus, they can
not be amortizable under section 195. In Notice 88-86, although
the Service stated that loan origination costs do not have to be
capitalized under section 263A, they specifically stated that they
were referring to only section 263A. Thus, the use of any other
Code section to clarify the issue at hand appears useless.
111. INDOPCO, 112 S. Ct. at 1044.
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Finally, in INDOPCO, the Court referred to the exclusive list
of deductible expenses, and this concept is clearly followed in Rev-
enue Ruling 92-80 and TAM 92-40-004. Advertising, a specific
Congressional exception, remained deductible, while asbestos re-
moval costs, a non-enumerated deduction, had to be capitalized.
Therefore, based on all of the information that can be
presented by both sides of the issue, the reasoning of the IRS Field
Agents appears much stronger than that of the ABA lending insti-
tutions. Accordingly, the future trend in taxation will inevitably
follow the lead of INDOPCO. Thus, because loan origination costs
are not a specifically enumerated deduction, and are incurred to
create an asset from which benefits flow to the lender beyond the
current taxable year, they will be required to be capitalized and
not deducted.
